Penthésilée, reine des Amazones, est représentée sous les traits d’une guerrière armée de pied en cap sur une tapisserie appartenant à la collection du château d’Angers. Cette tapisserie mille-fleurs qui date du début du XVIe siècle rappelle le succès rencontré par le thème des Neuf Preuses à la fin du Moyen Age. Ces figures de guerrières qui appartiennent toutes à l’Antiquité ou à la mythologie classique connaissent une mode qui répond à celle de leur pendant masculin, les Neuf Preux. Preux (...) et Preuses évoquent avec une certaine nostalgie un monde chevaleresque dont la réalité militaire du temps vient bouleverser tous les repères. (shrink)

Ces dernières années ont été marquées par un regain d’intérêt pour les héros. Deux expositions récentes en témoignent : Héros et merveilles autour de l’œuvre de Jacques Le Goff dans l’été 2007 à l’abbaye de Fontevraud et Héros, d’Achille à Zidane à la Bibliothèque nationale de France en 2007-2008. Les héros évoqués étaient, dans les deux cas, très majoritairement masculins : bien peu de femmes dans le Panthéon de Jacques le Goff et Jeanne d’Arc presque seule au milieu des (...) héros masculins à... (shrink)

In this article, I present the arguments of three republican women philosophers of eighteenth-century France, focusing especially on two themes: equality (of class, gender, and race) and the family. I argue that these philosophers, Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy, who are interesting and original in their own right, belong to the neo-republican tradition and that re-discovering their texts is an opportunity to reflect on women’s perspectives on the ideas that shaped our current political (...) thought. (shrink)

Moral or ethical questions are vital because they affect our daily lives: what is the best choice we can make, the best action to take in a given situation, and ultimately, the best way to live our lives? Health ethics has contributed to moving ethics toward a more experience-based and user-oriented theoretical and methodological stance but remains in our practice an incomplete lever for human development and flourishing. This context led us to envision and develop the stance of a “living (...) ethics”, described in this inaugural collective and programmatic paper as an effort to consolidate creative collaboration between a wide array of stakeholders. We engaged in a participatory discussion and collective writing process known as instrumentalist concept analysis. This process included initial local consultations, an exploratory literature review, the constitution of a working group of 21 co-authors, and 8 workshops supporting a collaborative thinking and writing process. First, a living ethics designates a stance attentive to human experience and the role played by morality in human existence. Second, a living ethics represents an ongoing effort to interrogate and scrutinize our moral experiences to facilitate adaptation of people and contexts. It promotes the active and inclusive engagement of both individuals and communities in envisioning and enacting scenarios which correspond to their flourishing as authentic ethical agents. Living ethics encourages meaningful participation of stakeholders because moral questions touch deeply upon who we are and who we want to be. We explain various aspects of a living ethics stance, including its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as some barriers to its enactment based on the reflections resulting from the collaborative thinking and writing process. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate whether phenomenological description can help in transforming an unjust or violent situation. If one can agree that describing the situation of a group of marginalised subjects is necessary in order to define what is going wrong, then the question of whether the method can help change these states, remains unanswered. With this in mind, I then suggest that phenomenological description can only serve critical causes, under the condition that it takes the transformative power of language (...) into account: by describing our experiences we already transform them. To this end, I draw on deconstructivist approaches, which focus on language as a social act of addressing oneself to others. I conclude by arguing that description can itself be a transformative tool – if we stress how it takes place under conditions of address that necessarily shape the experience to be described. (shrink)

Coinciding with the rising development of emerging markets, sustainable consumption practices in these markets are increasingly under scrutiny. In this context, we compare empirical results from consumers in four countries (three emerging markets and one developed market) in an experimental study to uncover patterns of preferences for sustainable luxury products (i.e., products that combine sustainability and luxury characteristics). Our findings illustrate that consumers’ quality, emotional, price, and social value perceptions, as well as purchase and electronic word-of-mouth intentions, are consistently higher (...) in all three emerging markets compared to the developed market. We find that sustainability (vs. conventional) product features increase consumers’ product value perceptions and behavioral intentions, although this effect is partially stronger for the developed compared to the emerging market(s). We further show a positive sustainability effect for luxury products, this effect is stronger for mass-market products. Combining sustainability and luxury signals leads to similar effects in emerging and developed markets. Thus, emerging markets have promise in terms of scope for incorporating sustainability characteristics into luxury products. Sustainable luxury consumption can therefore be understood as a manifestation of global consumer culture. (shrink)

In the wake of the Supreme Court Decision, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Minkoff, Vullikanti, and Marshall (2024) argue that the unraveling of the constitutional right to abortion t...

According to a grand narrative that long ago ceased to be told, there was a seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, during which a few heroes conquered nature thanks to mathematics. When this grand narrative was brought into question, our perspectives on the question of mathematization should have changed. It seems, however, that they were instead set aside, both because of a general distrust towards sweeping narratives that are always subject to the suspicion that they overlook the unyielding complexity of real history, (...) and because of a shift in our interests. The more obscure and idiosyncratic they are, an alchemist, a patron of the sciences or a lunatic collector is nowadays honored in journals of the history of sciences. As for the general issues involved in the question of mathematization, they are rejected as obsolete, or reserved for specialized journals in the history of mathematics. The article « Forms of mathematization » examines in general the notion of mathematization, distinguishes different forms of mathematization and defends a renewed study of the forms of mathematization in the history of the early sciences. (shrink)

Depuis Droit, mythe et raison (1980) écrit avec Jacques Lenoble jusqu’aux récents À quoi sert le droit? Usages, fonctions et finalités (2016) ou Le droit, objet de passions (2018), François Ost ne cesse de questionner les rapports de nos sociétés au droit et la place de celui-ci dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Avec Le droit malgré tout, il s’agit de rendre hommage à l’œuvre et à la carrière d’une figure centrale de la théorie du droit contemporaine et aussi au fondateur, avec (...) le regretté Michel van de Kerchove, de ce que l’on appelle parfois « l’école de Saint-Louis ». Abordant les deux pôles de la dialectique à laquelle François Ost est si attaché - la critique et la reconstruction -, l’ouvrage propose un regard interdisciplinaire sur le droit, à travers les principaux thèmes qui ont nourri la pensée de l’auteur. Du statut épistémologique de la science du droit à un questionnement sur les fondements et l’avenir du droit et de la justice, des liens qu’entretiennent le droit et la littérature jusqu’à l’environnement saisi par le droit en passant par les « communs », les approches de ses collègues et amis sont toutes réflexives et critiques. En ce qu’elles sont soucieuses de soumettre le droit au regard des sciences sociales et, inversement, les normativités extra-juridiques au regard du droit, elles sont fidèles à la démarche de François Ost. Ce Liber Amicorum propose aussi un retour réflexif sur son œuvre par l’auteur lui-même, dans un entretien avec Manuel Atienza. Contributeurs : Yves CARTUYVELS, Robert JACOB, Mark VAN HOECKE, Jacques COMMAILLE, Isabelle HACHEZ, Laurent VAN EYNDE, Jacques LENOBLE, Benoit FRYDMAN, Alain PAPAUX, Guillaume DE STEXHE, Diane BERNARD, Antoine GARAPON, Jacques CHEVALLIER, Alain SUPIOT, Paul MARTENS, Jérémie VAN MEERBEECK, Sébastien VAN DROOGHENBROECK, Nicolas BERNARD et Françoise TULKENS, Pierre LEGRAND, Annette RUELLE, Isabelle OST, Jeanne GAAKEER, Massimo VOGLIOTTI, Denis SALAS, Pauline BÉGASSE DE DHAEM et Marie-Sophie DE CLIPPELE, Xavier DELGRANGE, Delphine MISONNE, Benoît JADOT, Alain STROWEL, Hugues DUMONT, Jean-Guy BELLEY, Antoine BAILLEU. (shrink)

According to a grand narrative that long ago ceased to be told, there was a seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, during which a few heroes conquered nature thanks to mathematics. This grand narrative began with the exhibition of quantitative laws that these heroes, Galileo and Newton for example, had disclosed: the law of falling bodies, according to which the speed of a falling body is proportional to the square of the time that has elapsed since the beginning of its fall; the (...) law of gravitation, according to which two bodies are attracted to one another in proportion to the sum of their masses and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance separating them -- according to his own preferences, each narrator added one or two quantitative laws of this kind. The essential feature was not so much the examples that were chosen, but, rather, the more or less explicit theses that accompanied them. First, mathematization would be taken as the criterion for distinguishing between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics. Secondly, mathematization was founded on the metaphysical conviction that the world was created pondere, numero et mensura, or that the ultimate components of natural things are triangles, circles, and other geometrical objects. This metaphysical conviction had two immediate consequences: that all the phenomena of nature can be in principle submitted to mathematics and that mathematical language is transparent; it is the language of nature itself and has simply to be picked up at the surface of phenomena. Finally, it goes without saying that, from a social point of view, the evolution of the sciences was apprehended through what has been aptly called the "relay runner model," according to which science progresses as a result of individual discoveries. Grand narratives such as this are perhaps simply fictions doomed to ruin as soon as they are clearly expressed. In any case, the very assumption on which this grand narrative relies can be brought into question: even in the canonical domain of mechanics, the relevant epistemological units crucial to understanding the dynamics of the Scientific Revolution are perhaps not a few laws of motion, but a complex set of problems embodied in mundane objects. Moreover, each of the theses just mentioned was actually challenged during the long period of historiographical reappraisal, out of which we have probably not yet stepped. Against the sharp distinction between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics, numerous studies insist that Rome wasn't built in a day, so to speak. Since Antiquity, there have always been mixed sciences; the emergence of pre-classical mechanics depends on both medieval treatises and the practical challenges met by Renaissance engineers. It is indeed true that, for Aristotle, mathematics merely captures the superficial properties of things, but the Aristotelianisms were many during the Renaissance and the Early Modern period, with some of them being compatible with the introduction of mathematics in natural philosophy. In addition, the gap between the alleged program of mathematizing nature and its effective realization was underlined as most natural phenomena actually escaped mathematization; at best they were enrolled in what Thomas Kuhn began to rehabilitate under the appellation of the "Baconian sciences," i.e., empirical investigations aiming at establishing isolated facts, without relating them to any overarching theory. Hence, mathematization of nature cannot pretend to capture a historical fact: at most, it expresses an indeterminate task for generations to come. On top of these first two considerations, and against the thesis of the neutrality of the mathematical language, it was urged that mathematics is not "only a language" and that, exactly as other symbolic means or cognitive tools, it has its own constraints. For example, it has been thoroughly explained that the Euclidean theory of proportions both guides and frustrates the Galilean analysis of motion; its shortages were particularly clear with respect to the expression of continuity, which is crucial in the case of motion. Consequently, when calculus was invented and applied to the analysis of motion, it was not a transposition that left things as they stood. Even more clearly than in the case of a translation from one natural language to another, the shift from one symbolic language to another entails that certain possibilities are opened while others are closed. The cognitive constraints imposed by established mathematical theories, as seen in the theory of proportions or calculus, were not the only ones to be studied in relation to mathematization. Certain schemes dependent on the grammar of natural languages, e.g., the scheme of contrariety, or certain symbolic means of representation, e.g. geometrical diagrams and numerical tables, were also subject to such scrutiny. Lastly, it was insisted that, even if we concede the existence of scientific geniuses, mathematics is largely produced by intellectual communities and embedded within social practices. More attention was consequently paid to the forms of communication in given mathematical networks, or to the teaching of the discipline in, for example, Jesuit colleges and universities. The set of mathematical practices specific to specialized craftsmen, highly-qualified experts and engineers began to be studied in its own right. All these reflections may have helped us change our perspectives on the question of mathematization. It seems, however, that they were instead set aside, both because of a general distrust towards sweeping narratives that are always subject to the suspicion that they overlook the unyielding complexity of real history, and because of a shift in our interests. The more obscure and idiosyncratic they are, an alchemist, a patron of the sciences or a lunatic collector is nowadays honored in journals of the history of sciences. As for the general issues involved in the question of mathematization, they are rejected as obsolete, or reserved for specialized journals in the history of mathematics. Consequently, before presenting the essays of this fascicle, I would like to say a few words in favor of a renewed study of the forms of mathematization in the history of the early sciences. (shrink)

Parmi les épigrammes funéraires grecques consacrées aux enfants arrachés prématurément à la vie, plusieurs évoquent les jeux et les jouets de ces jeunes défunts. Si les garçons sont très présents dans ce corpus, quelques fillettes et jeunes filles ont également des activités ludiques. Cet article analyse trois textes en étudiant la dimension genrée de ces amusements et le discours sur l’enfance qu’ils livrent, tout en réévaluant nos définitions contemporaines du jouet appliquées aux mondes anciens. Notre étude porte sur l’inscription du (...) jeune thessalien Athénaios (tournant de notre ère), confrontée à deux épigrammes de l’Anthologie Palatine, l’une pour Myrô (VII 190, iiie s. av. J.‑C.) et l’autre pour Hymnis (VII 643, ier s. av. J.‑C.). (shrink)

This paper provides an account of the nature of creativity in high-energy physics experiments through an integrated historical and philosophical study of the current and planned attempts to measure the self-coupling of the Higgs boson by two experimental collaborations at the Large Hadron Collider and the planned High Luminosity Large Hadron Collider. A notion of creativity is first identified broadly as an increase in the epistemic value of a measurement outcome from an unexpected transformation, and narrowly as a condition for (...) knowledge of the measurement of the self-coupling of the Higgs. Drawing upon Tal’s model-based epistemology of measurement this paper shows how without change to ‘readings’ a transformation to the model of the measurement process can increase the epistemic value of the measurement outcome. Such transformations are attributed to the creativity of the experimental collaboration. Creativity, in this context, is both a product, a creative and improved model, and the distributed collaborative process of transformation to the model of the measurement process. For the case of the planned measurements at the HL-LHC, where models of the measurement process perform the epistemic function of prediction, creativity is included in the models of the measurement process, both as projected quantified creativity and as an assumed property of the future collaborations. (shrink)

The mechanical philosophy that emerged during the Scientific Revolution can be characterised as a reductionism according to which all physical phenomena are to be explained in terms of corpuscles of different sizes, shapes, and motions. It provided early modern natural philosophers with a unified view of nature that contrasted primarily with the Aristotelian view of nature, but also with other naturalist, hermetic, mystic, occultist, Paracelsian, and chymical accounts. Indeed, early modern natural philosophers devised mechanical explanations of almost every kind of (...) phenomena; even supranatural phenomena, such as transubstantiation, or phenomena today described as paranormal, like the action of sympathetic powder on a wound, the influence of the stars on terrestrial events, or the identification of thieves with a divining rod, were given mechanical explanations. Confronting this explanatory deluge, historians adopted two opposing narratives. The first narrative amounted to view the mechanical philosophy as a well-identified category that captured something about early modern natural philosophy. The critical narratives of the last thirty years, however, have deconstructed both the belief that it is an adequate historical category and the conviction that it made a positive contribution to the sciences. First, in an era that privileged microscopic case studies over sweeping panoramas, and emic over etic categories, ‘mechanical philosophy’ came to be thought of as lacking any real descriptive significance. Second, from an evaluative point of view, it has been claimed that the mechanical philosophy had no impact on the development of the new sciences. Considering these descriptive and evaluative challenges, taking the mechanical philosophy at face value is historically inadequate and philosophically naïve. Hence the questions addressed in this chapter: What to do with the mechanical philosophy? Does it have to be dropped completely as a category? And, if not, how is it to be used? My view is that it captures something of the transformations that we put under the umbrella of the Scientific Revolution, but that it is not possible to treat it as a naturally given category. Rather, to be employed usefully, it needs conceptual clarification and historical specification. (shrink)

On sait peu de choses d’Edme Mariotte, membre de l’Académie royale des sciences de 1668 à 1684. Une analyse de son Essai de logique montre cependant que, pour défendre ses pratiques expérimentales, il s’appropria des bribes venues de différentes traditions intellectuelles. Ainsi, ce livre examine ce qu’on entendait par « méthode » à la fin du XVIIe siècle, les épistémologies de la physique qui s’affrontaient alors, quelques débats ouverts par la gestion de l’héritage cartésien. Mais l’essentiel sera peut-être la question (...) suivante : comment reconstituer les idées d’un savant ordinaire, qui n’a ni bouleversé l’ordre des sciences, ni montré une perspicacité épistémologique exceptionnelle ? (shrink)

During the seventeenth century there were different ways of opposing the new mechanical philosophy and the old Aristotelian philosophy. Remarkably enough, one of this way succeeded in becoming stable beyond the moment of its formulation, one according to which Descartes would be the benchmark by which the works of other natural philosophers of the seventeenth century fall either on the side of the old or the new. I consequently examine the French debate where this representation emerges, a debate that took (...) place along with the development of a Cartesian propaganda in the 1660s and the ensuing official condemnations of the philosophy of Descartes, which was said to constitute a danger for the mystery of Eucharist. But these condemnations pronounced in the name of theology, as numerous and radical as they were, were not considered to be sufficient. They were assisted by numerous polemical works, the audience of which were learned companies of courteous honnêtes gens, and the object of which was to defend a certain way of proceeding in natural philosophy. I consequently concentrate on two correlated questions, the question of what kind of ontological entities are necessary for the establishment of a good physics, and the correlated question of what norms should be adopted in natural philosophy. I show quite systematically that the criticisms of Cartesian philosophers by the Oratorian Jean-Baptiste de La Grange, the bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet, and various Jesuits, Ignace Pardies, Antoine Rochon, Louis Le Valois, Gabriel Daniel, René Rapin, and Honoré Fabri respond to the mockeries of Gérauld de Cordemoy, Jacques Rohault, Louis de La Forge, Bernard Lamy, Nicolas Malebranche or Antoine Arnauld concerning the scholastic entities. Not only do I contrast their philosophical arguments concerning ontological entities and the norms to be respected in physics, but also their ways of defining the philosophical enterprise and its public. (shrink)

Early modern natural philosophers put forward the ontological program that was called "mechanical philosophy" and they gave mechanical explanations for all kinds of phenomena, such as gravity, magnetism, the colors of the rainbow, the circulation of the blood, the motion of the heart and the development of animals. For a generation of historians, the mechanical philosophy was regarded as the main alternative to Aristotelian orthodoxy during the so-called Scientific Revolution and mechanical explanations were presented as paving the way for the (...) use of experiments and mathematics in the understanding of natural phenomena. However, the historical category of mechanical philosophy was later criticized as being too broad, while early modern mechanical explanations were condemned by more epistemologically oriented minds for being incompatible with, or at least not necessarily connected to, the use of experiments and mathematics. In the last ten years, just as the new mechanistic literature emerged in philosophy of science, there has been a reevaluation of early modern mechanical explanations in a domain that had been until then considered as peripheral to the so-called Scientific Revolution, namely the domain of biology, anatomy, physiology and medicine. Although they were neither confirmed nor predictive, some early modern explanations in these domains appear to have a cognitive value similar to the value of contemporary mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

In Sandrine Bergès’s article ‘Revolution and Republicanism: Women Political Philosophers of Late Eighteenth-Century France and Why They Matter’ [2021], neo-Athenian and neo-Roman principles of republicanism are fused in order to show the idiosyncratic political position of Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy. As Bergès acknowledges, this amalgamation renders possible republican readings of women’s writings which so far have not been regarded as republican. Through my reading of Germaine de Staël and Mary Wollstonecraft, my aim (...) will be to show how Staël and Wollstonecraft embody the principles that Bergès highlights, but also venture into other areas tied to republican thinking that Bergès leaves untouched: religion and progress. Wollstonecraft and Staël both tie Christianity closely to their republicanism, maintaining that a future republican state will come through divine intervention. In this way, I hope to add complexity to Bergès’s project by expanding our knowledge of female republicans. (shrink)

Il est essentiel pour une chaîne de télévision, qu'elle soit publique ou privée, de connaître son public. Le groupe Francetélévisions s'est doté d'une direction d'études commune et de trois directions affiliées à chaque chaîne pour regrouper et analyser l'ensemble des données disponibles sur l'auditoire de la télévision. Face à la variété des outils et à la profusion des données, il est primordial de bien sélectionner ce qui est le plus pertinent pour répondre aux demandes des responsables de programme et de (...) programmation. La direction des études décortique les résultats d'audience par cible et utilise les logiciels permettant de suivre les flux de publics, les reports d'une chaîne à l'autre, etc. Les études qualitatives sont indispensables pour anticiper les réactions du public, pour améliorer un programme. Des sondages proposés par des instituts spécialisés complètent ces études internes .It is essential for both public and private television channels to know their audience. The France Télévisions group has set up a central research department covering each of its channels which also have their own individual research departments whose aim is to assemble and analyse all available audience data. Given the variety of tools and the large amount of data available, it is imperative to select well that which is the most relevant to answer demands coming from programme planners. The research and study department analyses audience ratings per target and uses software to follow audience movement, changes from one channel to another and so forth. Qualitative studies are essential to foresee audience reactions and to improve a program. Surveys proposed by specialised institutes complete these internal studies. (shrink)

Lately, a clamor can be heard, announcing that disinterested inquiry is neither possible nor desirable, that so-called “knowledge” is nothing but an expression of power, and that the concepts of evidence, objectivity, truth, are mere “ideological humbug” (p. 93). Thus, according to Richard Rorty, the champion of relativism, to call a statement true “is just to give it a rhetorical pat on the back” (p. 7), and “there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones” (p. 44). Similarly, for Sandra (...) Harding, a leading feminist, scientific work is best begun by “thinking from women's lives” (p. 116) and “the model…. (shrink)

À partir de l’analyse d’un extrait de l’Enquête sur l’entendement humain (septième section, première partie), cet article confronte les conceptions humienne, lockienne et malebranchienne de l’expérience du pouvoir de vouloir. Il montre comment un certain nombre d’arguments directement repris à l’occasionnalisme malebranchien, sont dirigés par Hume contre la thèse lockienne d’une genèse de l’idée de pouvoir dans l’expérience réflexive de la causalité volontaire, et avance que ces constats textuels mettent en lumière l’existence d’une divergence majeure, interne à l’empirisme, quant à (...) la portée de l’expérience que nous faisons du pouvoir de notre volonté. (shrink)

In Descartes's Cogito the mind discovers itself as an infinite power of self-assertion, a subjectivity, positing itself from within. But the mind also knows that it is finite, and receives its being from an "Other"--the infinite substance, or God, of which it finds within itself the idea, as one which cannot be derived from its idea of itself. The Cartesian conception of subjectivity is openness to the infinite. ;Descartes's ontological argument shows the infinite as radically "essence". But more fundamentally than (...) essence, or being, the Cartesian God is that which takes the initiative to create me and to put into my mind its "mark". By causing himself, and making himself known, he posits the order of being. ;A God bound to be the only being would be supreme powerlessness. The Cartesian God, as infinite power, is essentially creator. His power is not one which is immanent in the world and never comes out of itself; it cannot exclude the existence of distinct finite beings. God's infinite creativeness is the source of being in the endless variety of its forms and degrees. ;The infinite freedom of the subject manifests itself as rationality. God's veraciousness, rooted in his infinite creativeness, guarantees the reliability of reason. Thus, the movement of human knowledge proceeds from the infinite implicitly present in the operation of reason to the infinite explicitly recognized and hence opening up the endless possibilities of knowledge metaphysically certain of itself--albeit incapable of becoming actually infinite. ;The physical world, which can become object of knowledge once human reason is assured of its grounding in the infinite, is called by Descartes "indefinite". The world is not finite: the identity of matter and extension makes a limited world inconceivable. The world is not the infinite: it is not God. And if an image of the infinite is to be found in the created, it is not in the extended substance--pure multiplicity, parts next to parts--but in man's infinite freedom. (shrink)

Thought experiments play a role in science and in some central parts of contemporary philosophy. They used to play a larger role in philosophy of science, but have been largely abandoned as part of the field’s “practice turn”. This chapter discusses possible roles for thought experimentation within a practice-oriented philosophy of science. Some of these roles are uncontroversial, such as exemplification and aiding discovery. A more controversial role is the reliance on thought experiments to justify philosophical claims. It is proposed (...) that if we adopt an underlying empiricist view of concepts, then thought experiments can be seen as affording us contact with scientific practice, despite their seemingly a priori character. The advantages and drawbacks of thought experiments are discussed via comparison with case studies, on the one, and simulations on the other hand. The chapter closes with some remarks on how to combine thought experiments with other methods. (shrink)

In November 1664, a comet appeared in the European skies; by early March 1665, it had disappeared, but, at this very moment, another comet appeared, which stayed among the stars until mid-April. Observations of these two comets were made all over Europe, and even beyond. Although most secondary literature dedicated to these two comets has been focused on England and Italy, France was not to be outdone in terms of observations, small talk and publications. In this paper, I would like (...) to use the books that were published on these comets in France as a dispersive prism to understand the ongoing controversies about which principles should be accepted in natural philosophy in the mid-sixties. There were indeed several intellectual and institutional circumstances that gave a specific twist to the French debate: the sixties marked the beginning of the war between Jesuits and Cartesians that was to enflame learned France until the late nineties at least, they were also the period of gestation for the future Académie des sciences, and, finally, it is also during these years that French elites began to discredit systematically the practice of astrology as a popular superstition. My working hypothesis in this paper is that, in such circumstances, the two comets of 1664–1665 were an occasion for each camp to advocate publicly its positions about the proper principles for natural philosophy. By natural philosophical principles, I mean both ontological and epistemological principles. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article esquisse une généalogie du privilège que le terme concept a acquis en français par rapport à notion et à idée en se fondant non seulement sur les ouvrages des philosophes, mais sur des dictionnaires de langue philosophique. Il comprend quatre parties chronologiques. Après avoir étudié l’introduction des termes concept, notion, idée dans la langue philosophique, la première partie répertorie leurs usages dans les dictionnaires scolastiques du SVIIe siècle. La deuxième montre que Descartes a imposé idée en donnant (...) de ce terme une acception large et que les dictionnaires post-cartésiens la reprenne. La troisième établit que Kant a, contre cette acception large, introduit une distinction entre Begriff et Idee, mais que, initialement, les dictionnaires français refusèrent cette distinction. La quatrième et dernière partie est consacrée à un XXe siècle marqué par l’idéalisme allemand et l’analyse logique : aussi différentes qu’aient été ces deux traditions, elles ont été d’accord pour consacrer la prééminence du terme concept. (shrink)

Mirabeau and Sade, who were incarcerated in the Castle of Vincennes in the same period for breaching moral standards, pursued a correspondence filled with ethical reflections from their time in prison. Their epistolary exchanges in jail show their interest in the penal reform initiated by Beccaria and carried out at the end of the eighteenth century. Their letters likewise underscore the incommensurable aspect of institutional power, the failures of the French judicial system, and the strategies used to crush prisoners. They (...) denounce a world of inverted values in which duping the “deleter” becomes legitimate: the inmate becomes a victim of “brigands” and administrative “executioners.”. (shrink)

Mirabeau and Sade, who were incarcerated in the Castle of Vincennes in the same period for breaching moral standards, pursued a correspondence filled with ethical reflections from their time in prison. Their epistolary exchanges in jail show their interest in the penal reform initiated by Beccaria and carried out at the end of the eighteenth century. Their letters likewise underscore the incommensurable aspect of institutional power, the failures of the French judicial system, and the strategies used to crush prisoners. They (...) denounce a world of inverted values in which duping the “deleter” becomes legitimate: the inmate becomes a victim of “brigands” and administrative “executioners.”. (shrink)

The ontological status of forces and their causal role in Descartes’ physical world is debated among Descartes scholars. The question of forces is embedded in another more general question, namely to determine which causal activity should be attributed to God, and which causal activity should be attributed to physical bodies. Three distinct positions were attributed to Descartes: 1. he was an occasionalist and he attributed no causal power to forces, 2. he was a pure conservationist and he conceived forces as (...) entities distinct from matter and motion, 3. he was a concurrentist who attributed causal activity both to God and to second causes, especially to forces and laws. These three interpretations seem to exhaust the possibilities. In this chapter however, I defend another interpretation of Descartes’ position, according to which God intervenes in this world only to conserve it by his ordinary concurrence (in this I agree with the conservationist interpretation), without, for all that, forces or laws being specific entities (in this I agree with the occasionalist interpretation). My interpretation leads to downplaying the strong relationship which is assumed to exist between Descartes’ physics and his metaphysics. (shrink)

Leaving aside here the question of the author of the Essai de logique, I show that, if Mariotte insisted on the specificity of physics, he also sought a certain inspiration in mathematics as to the way in which to lay out the propositions in a proof. To do so, I start off from the ontological distinction made in the Essai among three types of possibles; next we will show that the three types of propositions correspond to three types of knowledge, (...) and, correlatively, that the main problem of physics is that it is impossible to establish in a certain fashion universal sensory propositions; I next characterize the notion of principles of experience; finally, I examine a bit systematically the relationship between mathematics and physics. (shrink)

The mechanical (or corpuscular philosophy) has been well-established as a historiographical category for some years now. While it certainly began as an actor’s category, it has slipped into being something else, a kind of broad catch-all category that is taken to include most of those who opposed the Aristotelian philosophy of the schools throughout the entire seventeenth century, part of a broad master narrative about the demise of the scholastic Aristotelian philosophy of the schools and the rise of modern mathematical (...) and experimental science, the titanic intellectual clash that gave birth to modernity. (shrink)

Jeanne Fichtner-Egloff analysiert die Epoche um 1900 in Japan und zeigt, dass sie als Übergang in ein neues Selbstverständnis in der Kunst zu verstehen ist. Mit den um 1910 herausgegebenen Schriften des Bildhauers und Schriftstellers Takamura Kōtarōs wurde zum ersten Mal die uneingeschränkte Ausdrucksfreiheit der subjektiven Empfindung eines Künstlers propagiert. Mit diesem Verständnis schien plötzlich ein allgemein gültiges Konzept von Kunst als autonome Schöpfung zu existieren, das sich an die Ideen der fauvistischen Künstler in Frankreich anlehnte. Gleichzeitig entstanden in (...) den Städten erste private Galerien und Messen und es bildeten sich eigenständige Künstlergruppen, die selbst Ausstellungen organisierten, ohne sich offiziellen Begutachtern zu unterwerfen. Diese Entwicklung erzeugte ein interessantes Spannungsfeld zwischen traditionellen Kunstauffassungen und neu rezipiertem westlichen Gedankenguts. (shrink)